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Abstract—In this work, we investigate a physical-layer key rec-
onciliation protocol for a reciprocal, flat fading channel between
two legitimate users. We consider the scenario when the n bits
of the secret key are measured independently by Alice and Bob
without a transmission over the channel. Due to reciprocity, the
generated keys are identical except for noise at both ends. We
assume Gaussian noise and ignore non-ideal behavior of circuitry
and alike. Redundancy information required to reconciliate the
key is transmitted from one legitimate user to the other. LDPC
codes are employed for the reconciliation procedure. The main
focus of this work lies in designing the code structure through
density evolution for a multi-edge-type description.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a wireless scenario with two legitimate users, Alice and
Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve, properties of the channel can be
used to provide security options to the legitimate users through
generating shared secret keys. We consider a reciprocal channel
between Alice and Bob, ideally ensuring identical amplitude
and phase properties. The secret key is obtained directly
via channel measurements, the information theoretic limits
of the described system are given in [1]. Independent noise
components originating from synchronization and quantization
errors, for example, might lead to key disagreement between
the users. Thus, to ensure that identical keys are obtained
on both sides, reconciliation procedures that require additional
side information to be transmitted need to be employed. More
details on the exact measurements, correlation between the
legitimate channels and eavesdroppers channel as a function of
the separation between the antennas relative to the wavelength
have been investigated in [1], [4]–[6]. Independent measure-
ments conducted in an indoor environment, for the purpose
of key generation, are described in [7]. For the purpose of
this work we assume that the eavesdropper is located further
away than the minimum coherence distance λ/2, resulting in
uncorrelated channels between the legitimate users and the
eavesdropper. In recent works, such as [7], this assumption has
been shown not to be very accurate and up to 10% of the
information can leak to Eve. However, coupled with privacy
amplification, such a problem is resolved, and thus, not the
focus of our contribution here.
 A. Filip is now with DLR, Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany.
In previous works, [2], [3], the reconciliation bits were sent
over a noiseless channel which is not realistic and in here,
we now address the case where the side information is made
available over a noisy channel.
While the secret-key agreement idea is based on the wiretap
channel model [8], we do not use the main channel by utilizing
SNR advantage based methods to transmit messages like in [9],
rather the fluctuating channel state is exploited to generate the
keys. In case of a line-of-sight channel, either movements or
reconfigurable antenna arrays allow to provide the necessary
randomization. Hence, the secret-key can be generated by
observing the channel state information (CSI) at Alice and Bob
[1].
The key generation technique discussed here would in gen-
eral use the Linde-Buzo-Gray or Lloyd-Max vector quantizers.
When assuming a Gaussian channel distribution, obtained,
e.g., by a large reconfigurable (RECAP) antenna array, the
quantization can easily be precomputed and results in a simple
cut in the middle of the distribution for the binary case. For
clearness of presentation, this conference paper will focus
on this binary case, only. For reconciliation, a Slepian-Wolf
[2] based method is employed using LDPC codes due to
their capacity approaching performance. Further details about
channel data, quantization aspects and results, as well as the
Slepian-Wolf LDPC scheme which was used, are provided in
[1], [11], [12].
Moreover, since the secret key is not transmitted over the
wiretap channel, but results from measurements plus side
information, the intrinsic log-likelihood ratio (LLR) calculation
required for the LDPC decoder is more involved and resulting
message densities are non-Gaussian and non-consistent. The
main contribution of this paper lies in designing the LDPC
code through density evolution for such a system.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the system
description is provided and code design aspects are discussed.
In Section III, the intrinsic LLR is derived and the properties
of this function are discussed. In Section IV and V, density
evolution steps for the system and the linear program for
designing the code are presented, respectively. Section VI
provides BER simulation results.
978-1-4799-5952-5/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE
Re
Im
co
un
t
4
-4
4
3
-3
2 -21
-1
-4
3
0
2
-2
1
-10
-3
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Fig. 1. Channel density for 24 REs.
cx
cy a = -1a = +1
-3.5
3.5
3.5
Fig. 2. Binary codebook. (note that we chose −1 to be on the right, which
has implications for the following figure)
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
For our investigation in this paper, we consider an ideal
Gaussian channel. In case of stationary users, the randomized
Gaussian channel can almost perfectly be obtained by large
RECAP antenna arrays; a corresponding channel density is
shown in Fig. 1.
At Alice, a parasitic RECAP array with 5× 5 elements, i.e.,
24 reconfigurable elements and a center feed element, is used
and at Bob, a single dipole antenna. The binary quantization is
presented in Fig. 2.
Alice and Bob estimate the channel in neighboring time slots
(TDD system) to generate the key. On Alice’s side, the analog
measurement data is then quantized and the key is generated.
We take Alice’s quantized result to be the correct key symbol.
Due to CSI differences arising from independent noise on Bob’s
side, his quantized results would be erroneous with respect to
Alice’s “correct” results. Hence, we require some reconciliation
procedure. Reconciliation is performed based on Bob’s analog
measurements through soft decoding.
A. Key Generation and Reconciliation: Slepian-Wolf Coding
For key reconciliation, Alice sends parity bits to Bob. We
notice two channels in the scheme at this point. First, there
is the channel which is measured by Alice and Bob, no data
is transmitted over this channel, which we will refer to as
the virtual measurement channel. There is also a transmission
channel over which Alice sends parity bits.
We have assumed the variance of the channel distribution
Alice and Bob encounter are identical. This assumption is
practical given that, in the time interval within which the CSI
measurements are made and the parity bits sent, the channel
distribution remains stationary, i.e., it is a quasi-static chan-
nel. Additionally, there is independent, identically distributed,
circular-symmetric Gaussian noise at Alice’s and Bob’s ends,
ignoring other effects due to hardware imperfections and alike.
Although we have formally defined two channels in our system,
the noise power on both channels (from Bob’s perspective) is
assumed to be the same i.i.d. AWGN.
As key reconciliation procedure, we use Slepian-Wolf coding
[2] based on LDPC codes. Since the key estimates at Alice and
Bob can be seen as correlated information due to the channel
reciprocity, Bob can decode his data using ’side-information’
or ’redundancy’ from Alice, hence Slepian-Wolf is appropriate.
The lower bound M for the redundancy is given in (1), where
H(a|b) is the conditional entropy of ’Alice’ given ’Bob’.
M = H(a|b) bit. (1)
For an n bit key, the number of reconciliation bits Mp are [12]
Mp ≥ nM = nH(a|b) bit. (2)
Here, of the two variants of Slepian-Wolf coding, parity and
syndrome, we chose the syndrome method for our implemen-
tation.
For the syndrome approach, the reconciliation information
is computed as the syndrome of the length n quantized source
vector a. A syndrome s is defined as
s = HaT , (3)
where H is the parity-check matrix. From (2), we know that
the reconciliation information should have length nH(a|b) bit.
The reconciliation information s is sent over the physical
channel and thus is subject to eavesdropping. To protect against
eavesdropping, at most twice the number of reconciliation bits
are needed. The procedure is termed privacy amplification [10],
however, we do not discuss this aspect in here further.
B. LDPC Code Construction
The Mp reconciliation bits (Slepian-Wolf syndrome ap-
proach) which are necessary for Bob to successfully decode
to Alice’s key are sent to Bob over the transmission channel
and must be error-protected due to the noisy channel. Hence,
the final code design has two sets of codes. The first code Cm
with generator and parity-check matrices Gm and Hm are used
to generate the syndrome for reconciliation by
s = HmaT , a = Alice′s quantized key. (4)
The length of syndrome s must satisfy (2). The second code is
used to protect the reconciliation bits obtained from (4). The
syndrome s is the information vector for the second code Cs
with generator and parity-check matrices Gs and Hs. The final
codeword v for the overall parity bits is then
v = sTGs = aHTmGs . (5)
The length of v is Mp(1 + β) where β is the fraction of
reconciliation bits required as additional redundancy for
forward error correction. Since there is a direct relationship
between Alice’s quantized vector a and and the final codeword
v, we can think of a single LDPC code with equivalent
generator matrix G = [In×n HTmGs] which encodes a
systematically for the information part and also computes the
redundancies (5) to be sent over the channel. The rate of the
code is given by
R =
n
n + Mp(1 + β)
. (6)
We use a multi-edge-type description due to the two channels
in our system, which is described in detail in [12]. Although
the noise power on both the channels is the same, the intrinsic
channel information (Lch) calculation for the measured key bits
and received parity bits are different at Bob’s end.
III. INTRINSIC CHANNEL INFORMATION DERIVATION
The channel between Alice and Bob is characterized by
AWGN noise with standard deviation σb. So the log-likelihood
ratio Lchv for the parity bits is straightforward assuming a
Gaussian pdf. For a received bit ri given that Alice transmitted
vi, the probability density function is
p(ri|vi = ±1) = 1√
2πσ2b
e
−(ri∓1)2
2σ2
b , (7)
Hence, the LLR is
Lchv = ln
⎛
⎜⎝e−
(ri−1)2
2σ2
b
e
− (ri+1)2
2σ2
b
⎞
⎟⎠ = 2ri
σ2b
. (8)
The intrinsic LLR calculation for the information bits, i.e., the
estimated key bits, is more complicated since the measurement
data is obtained by Bob and no information about Alice’s
quantization values is available to him, yet the LLR formulation
is
Lch(b) = ln
(
P (b|a = +1)
P (b|a = −1)
)
, (9)
where b refers to Bob’s analog measured value, and a denotes
Alice’s quantized value. Some steps of the derivation are
presented here, the complete description can be found in [13].
Since for the binary quantization we use, the decision boundary
is parallel to the imaginary axis, Lch values are dependent on
one dimension only.
For the 1-D case, a point cx1 from the channel distribution
is measured as ax and bx by Alice and Bob, respectively, with
variances σ2ax and σ
2
bx
, while the channel variance is σ2chx .
p(cx) =
1√
2πσchx
exp
[
− c
2
x
2σ2chx
]
, (10)
1The subscript x is used to address 1-D values of the complex distribution.
p(bx|cx) = 1√
2πσbx
exp
[
− (bx − cx)
2
2σ2bx
]
, (11)
p(ax|cx) = 1√
2πσax
exp
[
− (ax − cx)
2
2σ2ax
]
, (12)
Applying Bayes’ rule to (11) and (12), this yields
p(cx|bx) = 1√
2πσbx
exp
[
− (bx − cx)
2
2σ2bx
]
· p(cx)
p(bx)
, (13)
p(cx|ax) = 1√
2πσax
exp
[
− (ax − cx)
2
2σ2ax
]
· p(cx)
p(ax)
. (14)
Determining the probability of what Alice may have quantized
to,
P (ax = +1|bx) =
∫
R+
∫
R
p(ax|cx) · p(cx|bx) dcx dax , (15)
P (ax = −1|bx) =
∫
R−
∫
R
p(ax|cx) · p(cx|bx) dcx dax . (16)
Applying Bayes’ rule to (15) and (16), we finally obtain (17)
and (18), and use in (9) to obtain the required intrinsic LLR.
Note that, due to equal probability assumption P (ax = +1) =
P (ax = −1) = 0.5.
In Fig. 3, the Lch values for the quantization presented in
Fig. 2 are shown. The CSI measurements were mapped to a
two-dimensional discrete grid from [−3.5 to 3.5] on both axes
in increments of 0.005. Here, σ2ax = σ
2
bx
, some values of which
are provided in Table I. The SNR is defined as 10 log10(
σ2chx
σ2ax
),
where σ2chx = 0.4203. As expected, the Lch function is
TABLE I
VARIANCE VALUES
SNR [dB] σ2ax = σ2bx
11 0.0334
13 0.0211
15 0.0133
17 0.0084
19 0.0053
symmetric (odd). Additionally, we see that with increasing SNR
the magnitudes of the LLRs increase as expected.
A. Properties of the Intrinsic Log-likelihood Ratio Function
We first describe the consistency property of densities. A
density of probability f(x) is said to be consistent (i.e. with
exponential symmetry) if
f(x) = ex · f(−x) ,∀x ∈ R . (19)
Consistent densities have the property that
μ =
σ2
2
. (20)
For the design of an LDPC soft decoder, it is necessary to
differentiate between consistent and inconsistent LLR message
densities, as this property dictates the exact equations to be used
p(bx|ax = +1) = 12πσ2ax
1√
2πσchx
∫
R+
∫
R
exp
[
− (ax − cx)
2
2σ2ax
− (bx − cx)
2
2σ2bx
− c
2
x
2σ2ch
]
dcx dax · 10.5 , (17)
p(bx|ax = −1) = 12πσ2ax
1√
2πσchx
∫
R−
∫
R
exp
[
− (ax − cx)
2
2σ2ax
− (bx − cx)
2
2σ2bx
− c
2
x
2σ2ch
]
dcx dxa · 10.5 . (18)
bx
15 dB
13 dB
11 dB
17 dB
19 dB
−600
−400
−200
0
200
400
600
LL
R
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
SNR
Fig. 3. LLR (Lch) values for the binary codebook case
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Fig. 4. PDF of the Lch
in Density Evolution for calculating the mutual information
[15].
The Lch function for the binary case is a function of bx.
Using the density functions of bx, we obtain the densities of the
Lch functions. The density of bx is a Gaussian with variance,
σ21 = σ
2
chx + σ
2
bx , (21)
where, σ2bx decreases with an increase in SNR. The density
functions f(Lch) are plotted in Fig. 4 for SNRs of 11 to 19
dB. We now take a look at the (onesided) mean μ and variance
of the distribution in Table II and conclude that the density is
not consistent.
TABLE II
MEAN (μLch ) AND VARIANCE (σ2Lch ) OF THE Lch DENSITY
SNR [dB] μLch σ2Lch
11 3.1353 12.4572
13 4.1273 26.5784
15 5.4931 57.7666
17 7.4049 127.3862
19 10.2589 294.3257
IV. DENSITY EVOLUTION STEPS FOR LDPC CODE DESIGN
The LDPC code design is done through a linear optimization
algorithm based on a rate maximization criterion and uses
density evolution at both sets of nodes to check the convergence
through mutual information calculations. Hence, we take a look
at the Belief - Propagation (BP) decoding updates at the check
and variable nodes, respectively,
L(l)vicj = Lch,i +
∑
k =j
L(l−1)ckvi , (22)
L(l)civj = 2 tanh
−1
⎛
⎝∏
k =j
tanh
(
L
(l)
vkcj
2
)⎞⎠ . (23)
The subscript vc denotes an edge from variable-to-check node
and cv denotes a check-to-variable node edge.
At the variable node side, the outgoing message from node vi
to cj in the lth iteration is the sum of the incoming messages
from the remaining check nodes from the (l−1)th iteration and
the channel intrinsic information, Lch,i. In order to calculate
the mutual information xvicj , we need the density of message
Lvicj . Lch,i is represented by f(Lch,i). The addition of LLR
values to be passed along the edge connecting vi and cj leads
to a convolution of the contributing PDFs. Hence,
L(l)vicj :
2f(L(l−1)cv )  f(Lch,i) = f(L
(l)
vicj ) . (24)
Equation (24) requires some modification. We know, in general,
the LLR for a bit value xi given a received vector y is given
by (25).
From (25), it becomes clear that the ax = +1 and ax =
−1 probabilities are treated separately (i.e. under the ax =
2This density relates to the sum
∑
k =j L
(l−1)
ckvi from (22), the same applies
to (26) and (27).
ln
P (xi = +1|y)
P (xi = −1|y)
= ln
P (y|xi = +1)
P (y|xi = −1)
+ ln
P (xi = +1)
P (xi = −1)
= ln
P (yi|xi = +1)
P (yi|xi = −1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lintrinsic
+ ln
P (y\i|xi = +1)
P (y\i|xi = −1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lextrinsic
+ ln
P (xi = +1)
P (xi = −1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
La−priori
. (25)
±1 conditions, only probabilities under the same condition are
multiplied) and thus, in density domain, they are convolved
separately, too. Hence, following (24), we define
f(L(l)vicj |ax = +1)=f(L(l−1)cv |ax = +1) f(Lch,i|ax = +1),(26)
f(L(l)vicj |ax = −1)=f(L(l−1)cv |ax = −1) f(Lch,i|ax = −1) .(27)
We now write (28), used to calculate the mutual information
on the variable node side, using (26) and (27).
information nodes parity nodes
check nodes
Fig. 5. Density evolution steps at variable nodes. The dotted incoming lines
at a variable node represent the constituent densities of the incoming channel
intrinsic information.
We now focus on the check-node side, in order to find the
message densities required for the aforementioned convolution.
From (23), we see that the outgoing message from check
node i to variable node j in the lth iteration is a non-linear
combination of the lth iteration messages from variable nodes
vk, k =j to node ci. From [14], a general assumption can be
made that allows us to treat the outgoing message from a
check-node as having a Gaussian distribution due to the central
limit theorem, since there are many messages being combined.
Additionally, there we assume the messages to be consistent,
and thus, we employ a simplified version of (28) which makes
use of the exponential symmetry from (19) by using the mean
m of a consistent density, z ∼ N (m, 2m), and delivers the
mutual information xz [15]–[17].
J(m) = 1− 1√
4πm
∫
R
e−
(z−m)2
4m log2(1+e
−z)dz = xz. (29)
J(m) is a continuous and strictly monotonous function, so J−1
exists and allows for computing the mean m of the LLR from
the mutual information xz .
Since all messages Lckvi are considered consistent Gaus-
sians, in order to obtain f(L(l−1)cv |ax = +1) used in (26),
we need only add the means of the individual messages.
J−1 is used to obtain the means m and then added, due to
consistency, the variance can be calculated and the resultant
message represented. Due to symmetry, the mean has to be
mirrored only, to obtain f(L(l−1)cv |ax = −1) used in (27).
Now, we derive f(Lch,i|ax = +1) and f(Lch,i|ax = −1),
also used in (26, 27). However, let us first explain the LLR
random variable of the form (L|ax = ±1). L is a log-likelihood
ratio and thus already compares the probabilities of p(bx|ax =
+1) and p(bx|ax = −1). Further requiring the density of this
random variable under the conditions ax = +1 and ax = −1
may seem counterintuitive at first sight, however, the LLR is a
value dependent on bx and we only then consider the ax = ±1
range, i.e., we consider the values of bx as they result from the
ax = +1 or the ax = −1 ranges.
f(Lch,i|ax = +1) =
∑
bx:K−1(Lch,i)=bx
fbx|ax=+1(bx)
| dd(bx)Lch,i(bx)|
, (30)
f(Lch,i|ax = −1) =
∑
bx:K−1(Lch,i)=bx
fbx|ax=−1(bx)
| dd(bx)Lch,i(bx)|
. (31)
Where, K(bx) = Lch,i is shown in Fig. 3.
V. LINEAR OPTIMIZATION
After deriving the density evolution steps for our case, we
now present the linear programming algorithm for finding the
optimized degree distributions in Algorithm 1. The subscript j
is used to distinguish the two classes of variable nodes, j = 1
refers to information nodes, while j = 2 is for parity nodes. The
presented proportion distribution constraints are discussed in
detail in [12]. The densities required for convergence conditions
for variable nodes dealing with information estimates were
discussed in Section IV. Equations (41) and (43), the mutual
information updates at variable nodes for parity bits and check
nodes, respectively, follow from [17].
Note the check node side update step (43). We notice, within
the summation, the J−1 function is applied to (1 − xvc), i.e.,
addresses the mutual information on an outgoing edge of a
variable node. We know, in order to use the J−1 function, we
need the density of the LLR random variable to be consistent
but f(Lvc) is not since it is obtained by convolving with f(Lch)
at every iteration, which is not consistent. We however keep
this assumption on the check node side, for now. Under this
assumption, the linear optimization algorithm still converges.
We will address the more exact treatment of the incoming and
outgoing messages at the check node side in future realizations.
Density evolution can be summarized as a function of the
degree distributions, densities of the messages, and the mutual
information from the previous iterations. In order to assure
convergence, we require the mutual information to increase
after every iteration, as shown in (36). λ and ρ are the degree
distribution polynomials for the variable and check nodes,
respectively. We provide the results of the linear optimization
for 50 iterations. The routine delivers the fraction (1 + β)
of reconciliation bits (MP reconciliation bits mentioned in
(2), according to entropy calculations at the specified SNR
[11]) required as total redundancy for maximizing the rate
x(l)vicj =
∫
R
f(L(l)vicj |ax = +1) log2
(
2f(L(l)vicj |ax = +1)
f(L(l)vicj |ax = +1) + f(L(l)vicj |ax = −1)
)
d(Lvicj ) . (28)
Optimize
min
β∈R+
(1 + β) , (32)
subject to
1) Proportion distribution constraints [12]
1.1
2∑
j=1
dvmaxj∑
i=2
λ
(j)
i = 1 (33)
1.2 dvmax2∑
i=2
λ
(2)
i
i
=
dcmax∑
i=2
ρi
i
(34)
1.3
Mp
n
(1 + β)
dvmax1∑
i=2
λ
(1)
i
i
=
dcmax∑
i=2
ρi
i
, β ≥ 0 (35)
2. Convergence condition
F
(
λ,ρ, x
(l)
vc
)
> x
(l−1)
vc with , (36)
x
(l)
vcj=1 = 0; (37)
for i = 2 : dvmaxj , j = 1: information bits,
f(L
(l)
vc |ax = +1) =
f
(L
(l−1)
cv |ax=+1)
((i− 1)m)  f(Lintrinsic|ax = +1) , (38)
f(L
(l)
vc |ax = −1) =
f
(L
(l−1)
cv |ax=−1)
((i− 1)m)  f(Lintrinsic|ax = −1) , (39)
m = mean of the Gaussian densities.
x
(l)
vcj=1= x
(l)
vcj=1 + λ
(j=1)
i
∫
R
f(L
(l)
vc |ax = +1)...
log2
(
2f(L
(l)
vc |ax = +1)
f(L
(l)
vc |ax = +1) + f(L(l)vc |ax = −1)
)
d(Lvc) . (40)
end for.
x
(l)
vcj=2 =
dvmaxj=2∑
i=2
λ
(j=2)
i J
(
2
σ2b
+ (i− 1) J−1
(
x
(l−1)
cv
))
, (41)
x
(l)
vc =
2∑
j=1
x
(l)
vcj (42)
x
(l−1)
cv = 1−
dcmax∑
h=2
ρhJ
(
(h− 1) J−1
(
1− x(l−1)vc
))
. (43)
Algorithm 1: Linear programming algorithm
and the optimized degree distributions. The check node degree
distribution was fixed to be
ρ(x) = 0.98x9 + 0.02x10 . (44)
The maximum variable node degrees for the two classes were
chosen as dvmax1 = 15 and dvmax2 = 15. The length of the
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Fig. 6. Redundancy requirements delivered by the linear program
information word is n = 210 = 1024. Mp(1 + β) is the total
required redundancy.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 6 and Table III. As ex-
pected, with increasing SNR, the total required redundancy
decreases. The corresponding rates of the codes are also shown
in Table III. There is a lower bound for Mp(1 + β) derived in
TABLE III
REDUNDANCY AND RATE RESULTS
SNR [dB] Mp (1 + β) Mp(1 + β) Rate
11 419 1.4446 605 0.6286
13 335 1.6475 552 0.6497
15 273 1.8669 510 0.6675
17 222 2.1377 475 0.6831
19 181 2.4750 448 0.6957
[12] which explains the somewhat surprising behavior of the
growth of 1+β, making up for the decrease in the conditional
entropy with growing SNR.
VI. BER SIMULATION
The BER simulation was performed to check the perfor-
mance of the code. Note that the BER is an indicator for
the key agreement rate as it measures the mismatch between
Alice’s measured bits and Bob’s decoded bits, i.e., the binaries
of the secret key. Figure 7 shows the BER against SNR plot
for the code designed at 11 dB. The BER ratio for the un-
reconciled case is also provided for comparison purposes.
Degree distributions are provided in Table IV. No error floor
is visible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered a physical-layer key reconcilia-
tion scheme between two legitimate users of a reciprocal chan-
nel. The LDPC code designed for the reconciliation procedure
is obtained via density evolution. From the simulation results,
10−2
100
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10
0
number of iterations
SNR
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R
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5 iterations
4 iterations
10
10
10
10 12 14 16 18
un−reconciled
Fig. 7. BER results
TABLE IV
VARIABLE NODE SUB-DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS
SNR (1 + β) λ(1)(x) λ(2)(x)
11 dB 1.4446 λ2 = 0.1147 λ3 = 0.1574 λ2 = 0.2218
λ4 = 0.1938 λ8 = 0.1266
λ13 = 0.0417 λ14 = 0.1441
we conclude that the final design of the LDPC code delivers
promising BER results for the key reconciliation procedure
when the secret-key is generated by CSI measurements at Alice
and Bob. Extensions of this work would focus on exact density
evolution treatment on the check node side. The stability
conditions of the optimization have to be formulated for our
case, too.
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